Andreasen: A misguided missile proposal

03/15/2006

Steve Andreasen
Philadelphia Inquirer

“Given the possibility that intelligence about a fleeting target is wrong, erring with a conventional weapon is preferable to erring with a nuclear weapon, the strategic commander suggests.”

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rationale for keeping thousands of nuclear weapons atop long-range ballistic missiles ready to fire within minutes has evaporated. Moreover, nuclear weapons have little if any relevance to the “Global War on Terrorism” - terrorists are unlikely to be deterred by fear of a U.S. nuclear attack, and the president is unlikely to order one.

Reflecting these new realities, Gen. James Cartwright, commander of America’s strategic nuclear forces, has embraced the concept of “Prompt Global Strike” - a Pentagon effort to develop the capability to attack terrorists or weapons of mass destruction worldwide within 60 minutes with conventional weapons. Today, only long-range ballistic missiles have the ability to go anywhere from “zero to sixty” - and all of those missiles are currently armed with nuclear warheads under Cartwright’s command. Hence, the general’s proposal to equip some of the Navy’s submarine-launched Trident D-5 nuclear missiles with a conventional warhead - at a price tag of at least $500 million.

Even if one is tempted by Cartwright’s curious claim that the president should at least have the option of firing a long-range conventional ballistic missile to offset flawed intelligence, it’s hard to escape the conclusion that going down this path will undercut America’s most urgent national security goal: preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the use of these missiles - never before fired in combat - might easily lead to greater instability rather than fewer terrorists. Furthermore, the military scenarios used so far to justify the dollar cost of deploying conventional long-range ballistic missiles appear strained - in particular when measured against other urgent defense needs.

First, once the United States starts signaling that long-range ballistic missiles are no different than any other weapon in the war on terrorism, barriers to missile proliferation worldwide will be further eroded. Moreover, “conventional” missiles deployed in North Korea, Iran, India or Pakistan could easily be converted to carry nuclear weapons - the reason the United States and other nations have sought for decades to discourage the proliferation and use of conventional or nuclear ballistic missiles in every region of the globe.

Second, the notion that conventional long-range ballistic missiles are an indispensable silver bullet for our military deserves close scrutiny. In short: We know where rogue regimes are located, we know where “ungoverned” areas provide terrorist havens, and we are improving our existing conventional capabilities to deal with these threats - including precision guided bombs and cruise missiles carried on strategic and tactical aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and submarines. Moreover, it is far from clear that using a conventional long-range ballistic missile would in practice be “quicker” than using other conventional assets given challenges associated with identifying and locating targets, receiving authority to fire, and having submarines in position to shoot.

There may be other scenarios - for example, using U.S. long-range conventional ballistic missiles to preemptively strike North Korean ballistic missiles or China’s nuclear forces during a conflict over Taiwan. But if North Korea were about to launch a nuclear missile at America, there would be more - much more - than conventional Trident missiles heading toward North Korea. And a U.S. conventional ballistic missile attack against China’s nuclear forces would run a big risk of nuclear retaliation by China.

Third, an attack involving long-range conventional ballistic missiles almost anywhere one contemplates their use (e.g., the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Iran, Syria) is certain to get the attention of local populations - most likely Muslim - and further incite them in their opposition to the United States. Our struggle against radical Islam must be more than just a struggle to reduce the time to target Muslim nations.

Finally, Congress should look closely at the opportunity cost of spending hundreds of millions of dollars on conventional long-range ballistic missiles compared with other urgent defense priorities - for example, global port security, including radiation detection systems; National Guard and Army Reserve forces; and Nunn-Lugar programs to dismantle nuclear, chemical and biological arms overseas.

Cartwright and his command should be commended for thinking of how Strategic Command can help defeat terrorists. Congress and the American people must now decide whether making long-range ballistic missiles more usable weapons makes strategic sense.