Concerning Post-War, Post American, Iraqi Nationhood

11/26/2005

Paul Munnis

As the debate over leaving Iraq begins to solidify into consensus then the next issues deal with the U.S. legacy in Iraq and the region.

For discussion sake let us assume the following:

The new government is Federalist in style. It is theocratic by design. It is a member of the Arab League and is influenced by them as an Islamic State. In terms of its makeup it appears to be a clone of Iran. Bush will try to pass it off as a western-style government but it won’t be.

When the USA pulls out we are going to have a pile of iron that we will leave behind. These include tanks, trucks, portable housing units, radar equipment, storage tanks, munitions stockpiles, artillery, rocket launchers, weapons caches, ammunition stockpiles, Bradley fighting vehicles, and other materials of warfare where it is not good economics to give them a ride back to the USA. The first question is: “what of these should be given over to the Iraqi government and which should be detonated and destroyed?” Why?

Another key question is what sort of military legacy should the USA leave to the new Iraqi government? Should we empower them to be strong; and even stronger than their neighbors? Should be endow them with an Air Force and an aerial bombing capability? What about the ability for limited naval operations? Is there a need for an oil well protection and security system? What sort of armed forces are needed for that? How should they be equipped? Who should they report to? What about border protection? How will Iraqi oil be delivered, and where, and how will a delivery system be built and protected?

How do the Iraqi police and the Iraqi Army relate to one another and what basis is there in law for the resolution of political differences? How can the Army be kept from usurping the government, overthrowing it at will, and performing insurrection every time there is a disagreement? What checks and balances exist for government? How will a government operate in Iraq without a legal system that is formally instituted and agreed to by all to be supported? How can Civil War be prevented?

We have only scratched the surface of questions pertaining to a post-Iraqi War society and only touched upon two key subject areas: military and legal.

The Iraqi Constitution is too weak to permit an immediate shouldering of a western style democratic system and America has not used the time in Iraq wisely to help them forge the new sub-systems needed for democratic self-government. This leaves Iraqi’s only one choice: revert to traditional and historic forms of governing. That in turn virtually assures a return to Islamic Law, Islamic Customs, Islamic Culture, and Islamic Rule. Islam is the only well understood method available right now in Iraq.

We thus predict that the Iraqi Constitution will be thrown out the window and that a new strong-man leader will emerge to replace Saddam Hussein and that the Army and Police forces will both report to him. We suspect that Iraq, five years after the U.S. leaves, will look like it did when Saddam ruled with one exception: the new government will offer more largesse to the people than Saddam did. Wealth will not go to building big new palaces but instead will go to creating government programs to grow food, find water, provide infrastructure, and to perform other job producing tasks that will restore an Iraq indigenous economy.

The macro economy will be managed by the new strong-man and he will broach no tolerance for opposition. He will be forced to exterminate all who disagree with him or his polices. A continuous consolidation of power must result and history has shown a brutal dictatorship then follows.

The question of a need for foreign currency will come down to the subject of the control of oil wells, the only major source of foreign currency earnings. Will the USA retain them? Will a contract be forged between the USA and Iraq for their output? Who will invest in their underground engineering? What guarantees exist for a return on investment? Who will own and operate them? How will revenues be allocated per federated state? Without a stock market can investment flow and sufficient incentives for capitalism develop?

The purpose of this short piece is to make the reader realize that Iraq after the U.S. leaves is going to be a volatile and difficult nation to govern and will likely revert to type rapidly right after the USA leaves.

Not only will the nation revert to type but it will likely be hostile and bitter towards the USA. Unless some very advanced thinking is advocated as a part of the terms of withdrawal, then the U.S. will lose all influence with Iraq. The U.S. legacy will be little and the loss of American lives will have been for naught.

It is time for Americans to forge a significant discussion concerning leaving Iraq and what the desired outcome is when we do leave and how to guarantee a value-added legacy.

For my part the managerial skills of the Bush Administration have been poor in the extreme. They have no concept of how to set meaningful goals or how to structure and manage in order to achieve the goals. Thus we can expect a zero legacy to result. Instead, I expect a clumsy withdrawal and much finger pointing at Democrats as Iraq collapses because of bad post-war planning. A stupefied Bush Administration will just stand there and say: “Duh…., it’s the fault of them Democrats….”

An urgent planning session is needed in Washington, right now, establishing the structure of post-war Iraq and determining American policy and influence towards Iraq, Afghanistan and the whole Arab region after the U.S. troops are withdrawn from Iraq.

Don’t expect an enlightened G.W. Bush to conduct this sort of planning session either. He is not capable of it. I think it must come from a combination of Academia, the various Think Tanks, with former U.S. military planners contributing, and must include much of the Iraqi intelligentsia.

Do not expect much help from the State Department or others at a Bush cabinet level. The results will have to go to the Senate and they must find a way to assure that the plans are adopted and implemented. That means a basic method of powerful remote influence on the Iraqi government by the U.S. has to exist after withdrawal. What should that consist of?

The time to plan for peace is while still at war. We have squandered three years of such planning opportunity and much of it should have been done even before invading and occupying Iraq. We are going to have to now scramble to make it up. We Americans had better be careful what we wish for where Iraq is concerned because we will likely have to pay for much of it. There is no time to lose either.