Future of Iraqi Defense Unclear

07/29/2006

Saturday, July 29, 2006, 9:30 a.m. local time

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - Eight months ago, it all seemed quite different. The Iraqis were going to “stand up,” and American troops were going “to stand down.”

Sure, the Iraqis may not have the firepower nor all the fancy computer gadgetry of the high-tech American fighting force, U.S. officials said last year. And the potbellies all too familiar at Iraqi recruiting stations might not pass muster at Fort Benning.

But the Iraqis were going to bring something else to the equation that American and other international troops in Iraq never could.

“Bringing skills and knowledge to the fight that coalition forces cannot, Iraqi troops know their people, language, and culture,” the White House said in a November 2005 fact sheet entitled Training Iraqi Security Forces.

“They know who the terrorists are and are earning the trust of their countrymen. As Iraqi forces grow in size and capability, they are helping to keep a better hold on cities and are increasingly taking the lead.”

Things look different now - after 6,000 Iraqis were killed in May and June alone, according to the United Nations.

“Undoubtedly the Iraqi people have lost confidence in the police,” Britain’s outgoing ambassador to Iraq, William Patey, told the British Broadcasting Corporation last Thursday.

On the same day, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was lengthening the tours of about 3,500 members of the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team for up to four more months as part of a plan to bolster U.S. troop strength to shore up Iraqi security forces that are in danger of losing this capital to the gunmen.

What’s more, the Pentagon is signaling plans to maintain or possibly increase the number of American service members in Iraq. Not so long ago, word was that substantial troop cuts were in the works by the end of the year - and in time for the midterm U.S. elections.

Now, it looks like even more Americans will be spending Christmas in Iraq - and not with their families back home.

So what went wrong? Were the rosy predictions of last November pure illusion?

No, but those forecasts glossed over a lot of problems. And under political pressure to wind down in Iraq, the Bush administration wasn’t anxious to advertise what its people on the ground here were privately telling them - building a capable Iraqi force is going to take a long time.

Few Sunni Arabs have joined the security forces, which are heavy with Shiites and Kurds. They may all be Iraqis. But if they are from a different sect or ethnic group, Iraqi soldiers and police are not fully trusted by civilians. Having American troops with the Iraqi units is supposed to build confidence that the U.S. soldiers will make sure the Iraqis in uniform protect Shiites and Sunnis alike.

The Americans will also press the Iraqis to disband sectarian militias. That too won’t be easy. The militias flourish because civilians trust the gunmen more than government forces to protect them from the rival sect. Until Iraqis trust the Iraqi army more than the militias, no amount of force or appeals from political leaders will undermine support for the gunmen.

It’s by no means clear the new strategy will be more successful than the old. At best, success will take time, patience and support from the public - not only in Iraq but in the United States as well.