It’s time to get out of Iraq - carefully

09/20/2006

Steve Andreasen and Steven N. Simon
Philadelphia Inquirer

The war in Iraq is front and center this election season.

President Bush is again making the case that “the security of the
civilized world depends on victory in the war on terror, and that
depends on victory in Iraq” and “if we give up the fight in the
streets of Baghdad, we will face the terrorists in the streets of our
own cities.”

Most Democrats, and a growing number of Republicans, while opposed to
immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq, believe the Iraq
war has been a distraction from the war on terror, and that
Washington should make clear to the Iraqi government that U.S. forces
will be coming home.

We can expect the rhetoric surrounding these alternatives to get even
blunter as both parties try to hammer home politically advantageous
caricatures of the other’s position. Yet, no matter what the outcome
on Election Day, one hopes that both the president and the new
Congress will agree on a so-far elusive formula: how to withdraw from
Iraq without further strengthening the appeal of radical Islam.

That effort should begin with a belated recognition of two essential
points. First, the outcome of our struggle with radical Islam -
whether the Sunni strain typified by al-Qaeda or Shia strain embodied
by the mullahs of Iran - will in no small measure be determined by
Washington’s ability to navigate renewed feuding between Sunnis and
Shias that our intervention in Iraq has touched off. Second, we are
more likely to make matters worse through an indefinite occupation of
Iraq, which is likely to force our taking sides in an Iraqi civil war
between Shias and Sunnis.

For these reasons, our strategy for the region must include the
withdrawal of large U.S. combat units from Iraq; the longer we stay,
the more likely we are to further inflame anti-American passions,
mobilize jihadists in the region and in Europe, and find ourselves
demonized by both sides of the Sunni-Shia divide. Yet, we must manage
our withdrawal in a way that preserves to the greatest extent
possible our ability to influence the Iraqi government and provides
support for Baghdad’s campaign to control more than the Green Zone,
while minimizing perceptions that an opponent flying the flag of
militant Islam has bested the United States.

Our strategy should rest on three pillars.

First, a large-scale U.S. and European economic assistance program
targeted on key countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan,
Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the West Bank and Gaza). The goal
would be to provide better schooling and economic opportunity to an
increasing number of semi-educated youths who are largely
disconnected from the benefits of a global economy and thus
susceptible to arguments that “globalization equaling Westernization”
is harmful to Islam. Coupled with an urgent effort by European
countries to provide economic opportunity to Muslims within their own
borders, this will require an investment that will extend for many
years and require billions of dollars more in foreign aid than are
contemplated today. Building a large, educated middle class in the
region that is friendly to our interests will also require a more
liberal U.S. trade policy as well as more effective management of
U.S. foreign assistance programs to ensure aid gets to the intended
recipients.

Second, the appropriate economic, security and diplomatic incentives
should be given to governments in the region to pursue policies to
bridge the Sunni-Shia divide, in particular in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
Lebanon and Pakistan, including political reforms that will provide
an avenue for Shia and secular participation and empowerment.

Third, a sustained, good-faith effort by Washington to bring about a
Palestinian state that ensures the basic needs of the Palestinian
people and does not threaten the safety of Israelis. In brief, this
process will require a level of engagement by Washington that looks
more like that undertaken by the Clinton administration than the
“hands off” approach we have seen the last six years.

Finally, our efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Arab street
have been uneven - and require a more effective effort at all levels.
But public diplomacy does not take place in a policy vacuum.
Improving our “image” in the region will take more than sending
American ambassadors who can speak Arabic or Urdu.

To accomplish all of this, we will need an unprecedented degree of
bipartisanship in Congress, and an administration committed to begin
withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq. Let’s hope we don’t have to wait
another two years after this election to get started.

Steve Andreasen was director for defense policy and arms control on the National
Security Council from 1993 to 2001

Steven N. Simon is the Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at
the Council on Foreign Relations

Contact the writers at and